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Abstract
Algorithmic trading has reshaped equity markets
and had significant effects on market performance. We
examine the effect of algorithmic trading in online
peer-to-peer lending markets. These markets were
originally designed to be accessible to individual
investors, however, because algorithmic trading is
typically used by institutional investors with
substantial resources, algorithmic trading threatens to
shut individual investors out of the market. Ironically,
this could exacerbate inequalities in the financial
system that peer-to-peer lending markets were
designed to help eliminate. To study the effects of
algorithmic trading, we examine an API upgrade on
Prosper.com that facilitated algorithmic trading.
Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that
individual “manual” investors were crowded out of
the most quickly-funded and typically best-performing
loans after the API upgrade. However, the API
upgrade may have increased the size of the market,
thereby allowing individual investors to continue
investing in the market, albeit for somewhat lower
quality loans.

1. Introduction
Decisions that were previously made by humans
are increasingly being made by information systems.
One example is algorithmic trading, which we
examine in this study. Algorithmic trading, which can
be loosely defined as “the use of computer systems to
execute trading strategies” [1], has reshaped equity
markets and had significant implications for market
performance [2]. Algorithmic trading also raises
questions about fairness, given that some market
participants do not have the expertise or sophistication
to use the technology. This may create an uneven
playing field in which sophisticated investors who
engage in algorithmic trading crowd out
unsophisticated investors who do not.
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We investigate the implications of algorithmic
trading in the context of peer-to-peer lending. In peerto-peer lending, borrowers seeking loans create
listings on web sites such as Prosper.com and
LendingClub. Investors choose which of these
borrowers to fund based on these listings. If a
borrower’s listing attracts enough investors, then s/he
can receive the loan. In this context, we use the term
“algorithmic trading” to refer to the practices of
automated and data-driven decision making enabled
by API. Peer-to-peer lending is an interesting context
for our analysis for two reasons. First, as reflected by
the “peer-to-peer” label, online lending markets were
originally designed to connect individual (and
presumably non-sophisticated) investors with
borrowers. The original model was that these
individual investors would access the web site
manually to review listings and identify which of their
“peers” they wanted to lend to. This model is changing
as institutional investors fund an increasing percentage
of online loans, largely via algorithms that select the
loans automatically (and very quickly). This threatens
to upend the traditional model upon which online
lending originally flourished. Second, this context
allows us to extend prior research on the effects of
algorithmic trading. In most contexts in which
algorithmic trading has been studied (e.g., the stock
market), the same assets (e.g., stocks) may be bought
and sold multiple times. This means that there are
always opportunities for non-sophisticated investors
to purchase or sell assets. This is not true of online
loans. Once these loans are funded by an investor(s),
they are no longer available to other investors. Thus, it
is possible that algorithmic trading could allow
sophisticated investors to capture the entire online
lending market. Further, the ultimate impact of
algorithmic trading in these markets is unclear.
“Manual” investors argue that they are crowded out of
the market because they cannot match the speed
advantage of the algorithmic investors. Algorithmic
investors argue that the algorithms help satisfy
borrowers’ needs more quickly and efficiently, which
leads to market growth and more opportunity for all
investors, including manual investors.
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We use data from Prosper.com to study the effects
of algorithmic trading. Because we cannot directly
observe which investors use algorithmic trading
technologies, we study the effect of a policy change
that facilitated algorithmic trading. On March 11,
2013, Prosper.com released a major upgrade to its API
(Application Programming Interface). The new API
made it easier to algorithmically select loans to fund
by providing more data fields and improving response
time. If the API helped institutional investors “crowd
out” manual investors via algorithmic trading
strategies, then we should see the followings after the
release of the new API: high-quality loans being
funded very quickly (too quickly to be funded
manually) and by a relatively small number of
investors who loan large amounts. Using a differencein-differences strategy, we find precisely that. This
suggests that manual investors are being “crowded”
out of the market by algorithmic trading. However,
there is some evidence that algorithmic trading has led
to market growth, such that opportunities remain for
manual investors, although these are typically for
lower quality loans as measured by default risk and
yield.

2. Literature review and theoretical
foundation

2.1. Investor decision making in online peerto-peer lending markets
Manual investors tend to rely on both traditional
financial information and “soft” information to make
investment decisions [3]. In addition to traditional
financial information, the decision making process is
influenced (and biased sometimes) by several factors,
including peer decisions, borrowers’ friendship
networks, loan descriptions, geographical distance,
cultural distance, political distance, and borrowers’
appearance, gender, and race [4-15]. Some recent
studies distinguish sophisticated investors from
manual investors and find that they rely on different
information to screen loans or projects, but their
investing performance is not necessarily different [1618]. Although there is some evidence that
sophisticated investors might evaluate borrowers
differently, it is unclear how this difference affects
market opportunities for different types of investors.

2.2. Algorithmic trading in equity markets
Algorithmic trading refers to “the use of computer
systems to execute trading strategies” [1] or “any form
of
trading
using
sophisticated
algorithms
(programmed systems) to automate all or some part of

the trade cycle” [19]. Algorithmic traders may be both
faster-acting and better-informed than manual traders
[2]. Algorithmic traders can act faster because their
trades are executed automatically based on decision
rules, and they may be better informed because trades
are based on statistical models fed by rich market data.
Algorithmic trading improves price efficiency,
reduces price discovery and information acquisition,
and increases market liquidity [1, 20]. These findings
stem largely from stock markets where algorithmic
investors can provide liquidity by buying and selling
stocks without necessarily eliminating opportunities
for manual investors to also buy and sell. However, it
is unclear what the impact of algorithmic trading
would be in a market where algorithmic investors
compete with manual investors for a fixed set of assets,
such as for loans in the peer-to-peer lending context.
Accordingly, we investigate the implications of
algorithmic trading on an understudied outcome, i.e.
investors’ participation.

2.3. How Algorithmic trading might influence
investor participation
The basic components of algorithmic trading are
automation and information [2]. The automation
component means that most or all of the trade is
executed by automated systems and technologies. In
the context of online lending, automation enables
investors to automate their investment decisions rather
than manually logging into the platform, picking
loans, and placing orders. Therefore, automation
should speed up funding time, which becomes our first
hypothesis (H1): algorithmic trading can decrease loan
funding time. The information component means that
investors use models/algorithms to analyze
information to evaluate and select borrowers. Because
it is widely expected that data-driven statistical models
can improve decision efficiency and accuracy, we
hypothesize that algorithmic trading can improve
investment performance, i.e. the performance of loans
selected by algorithms should be higher (H2).
Combining H1 and H2, it is reasonable to expect that
manual investors would be crowded out of the best,
most quickly-funded loans. We thus propose the third
hypothesis (H3): algorithmic trading decreases the
number of investors of “flash” loans, which we use to
denote the top 20% of loans in terms of funding time,
from fastest to slowest.
Besides a direct impact, algorithmic trading might
also indirectly influence the whole market. This might
occur if algorithmic trading decreases funding time
and increases decision efficiency. Decreased funding
time might retain/attract more borrowers to online
lending platforms. Increased decision efficiency
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(either real or perceived) might increase investors’
confidence and motivate them to fund more
borrowers, especially those risky borrowers in whom
they otherwise won’t invest. These two effects could
lead to a larger market size, which is our fourth
hypothesis (H4). Because H3 suggests less investor
participation while H4 suggests more, there is no prior
theoretical expectation for the overall impact of
algorithmic trading on investor participation.
Therefore, we propose our final hypothesis in a nondirectional way, saying algorithmic trading might
either increase or decrease investor participation (H5).
Table 1 summarizes these five hypotheses.
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5

Table 1. Research hypotheses

Algorithmic trading reduces loan funding time.
Algorithmic trading increases lending performance.
Algorithmic trading reduces number of investors.
Algorithmic trading increases market size.
Algorithmic trading increases or decreases the
overall investor participation.

3. Empirical setting and data
3.1. Empirical setting

The focal online lending platform that we study is
Prosper.com. Prosper.com operates in the following
way (since 2011): (1) borrowers submit their loan
requests and personal financial information to
Prosper.com; (2) Prosper.com underwrites the
requests (to set the interest rate) and posts the loan
requests (i.e., “listings”); (3) investors choose which
borrowers to fund and how much to fund; and (4)
borrowers receive their loans if they attract enough
investment (either 70% or 100% of the requested
amount, depending on borrower’s choice). Initially,
step 3 was conducted manually by investors.
Currently, much of step 3 is conducted via algorithmic
trading in which sophisticated investors use data
provided by Prosper.com (perhaps combined with
other data) to automatically select and fund loans.

3.2. Data and variables
We gathered a dataset of 63,706 loans funded
through Prosper.com from 2011 to 2013. We created
several variables to describe each loan. Funding time
is the difference between when the loan was first
posted and when it was funded. We created two
measures of investor concentration per loan: Number
of investors is the number of investors per loan, and
average funding amount is the average amount that
each investor invested in the loan. We measured each
loan’s performance via compound annual growth rate
(CAGR) and internal rate of return (IRR) as well as

whether the borrower defaulted on the loan (default
status). We use the following as control variables: loan
interest rate, amount borrowed, monthly payment, and
several variables about the borrower, including
monthly income, debt-to-income ratio (including the
loan), months employed, number of credit inquires in
the last 6 months, and open credit lines. Table 2
provides descriptive statistics of this dataset.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Loan Funding Variables
Funding time (in hours)
48.48
80.92
Funding time (in logged seconds)
8.55
4.06
Number of investors
66.66
90.06
Average funding amount per
3,227.27
5,902.76
investor
Amount borrowed
9,045.99
6,147.36
Interest rate
0.202
0.072
Loan Performance Variables
Compound annual growth rate
0.023
0.141
(CAGR)
Internal rate of return (IRR)
0.050
0.185
Default status
0.204
0.403
Loan Credit Variables
FICO score
697
38.751
Monthly payment (in $1,000)
0.294
0.183
Borrower stated monthly income
5.921
9.161
(in $1,000)
Debt-to-income ratio
0.401
0.512
Months employed
104.433
97.415
Inquires in last 6 months
0.981
1.427
Open credit lines
9.426
4.912
Notes: This dataset contains 63,706 loans that are (1)
eventually issued and (2) listed on Prosper platform from
2011 to 2013. Debt-to-income ratio is capped at 2.

We also gathered a complementary dataset of all
listings that appeared on Prosper.com during the same
period. Not all listings become funded loans. Listings
may expire (if a listing fails to pass the funding
threshold), be canceled by Prosper.com (if a listing is
incomplete or contains incorrect information), or be
withdrawn (if the borrower withdraws the loan
application due to personal reasons). This dataset
allows us examine changes in the size of the market.

4. Empirical strategy, analysis, and
results
Because we cannot directly observe investors’ use
of algorithmic trading technologies, we study the
effect of a major upgrade to Prosper’s API on March
11, 2013 that facilitated algorithmic trading. This
upgrade yielded three key improvements. First, the
data structure exposed by the API became more userfriendly, such that investors could use the API more
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easily. In addition, the API became faster and more
responsive. Second, approximately 460 new data
elements were made available through the API,
thereby permitting more sophisticated loan-selection
models. Third, the API allowed investors to use thirdparty tools, thereby providing more options for
investors to use API.

4.1. Model free evidence
We first investigated the funding time of loans
across time. We classified funded loans into three
categories based on how fast they got funded: top 20%
(“flash” loans), the middle 60%, and the bottom 20%
(“leftover” loans). Panels A, B, and C of Figure 1 show
the median funding time of each group day by day
from January 1, 2013 to March 31, 2013 (because the
whole lone program was launched April 2013 so we
excluded observations after March 31 to avoid
confounding effects). A notable pattern is that funding
time of “flash” loans drops significantly after the new
API was released on March 11, but the funding time
of “leftover” loans is almost unchanged. Panel D of
Figure 1 shows the percentage of loans that get funded
within 60 seconds, 10 minutes, and 1 hour across time.
By the end of March 2013, about 10% of loans are
funded in 60 seconds and 30% of loans are funded in
10 minutes. This suggests that these loans are being
funded algorithmically, given that manual investors
are unlikely to be able to fund loans this quickly.

released on March 11, fewer investors share in “flash”
loans or in the middle 60% of loans. This suggests that
these loans are being funded by institutional investors
who provide a larger portion of the loan fund.

4.2. Empirical Strategy
To better identify the effect of the API upgrade,
we use a difference-in-differences strategy, which is
widely used in studies about platform implementation,
policy change or technology change [21-23]. As
shown in the model-free analysis, the “leftover” loans
(i.e., those funded last) were largely unaffected by the
API upgrade. We believe that this is because these
loans are typically funded by manual investors who
are not influenced by the API upgrade (because they
don’t use the API). Thus, we use “leftover” loans as
the control group. Conversely, the “flash” loans appear
to be affected by the API upgrade, and we consider
them to be the treated group. The difference-indifferences approach allows us to separate the effect of
any general supply or demand shock or macroeconomic trend (which should affect both “flash” and
“leftover” loans) from the effect of the API upgrade
(which should not affect “leftover” loans). We use the
middle 60% of loans as a secondary treatment group.
Including them allows us to check the proposed
mechanism, because we expect them to be affected in
the same direction as the “flash” loans but with a
smaller magnitude. It is worth noting that the
“leftover” loans don’t serve as a strict control group
because they are also influenced by the API upgrade.
If we assume the impacts of the API upgrade have the
same direction on all three groups, we actually
underestimate the impact of API upgrade by viewing
“leftover” loans as the control group.

Figure 1. Funding time by group across time
We next investigated investor concentration in
loans over time. Panel A of Figure 2 shows the median
number of investors per loan of each group from
January 1, 2013 to March 31, 2013 while Panels B, C,
and D of Figure 2 show the median average funding
amount per investor per loan. After the new API was

Figure 2. Funding time and investor concentration
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To avoid conflating our analysis with other policy
changes made by Prosper.com, we restricted our
analysis to the days close to the March 11, 2013
treatment date. At the month level, we define February
2013 as the pre-treatment period while March 2013 as
the post-treatment period. We only show analysis
results at the month level, but our findings are also
robust at day level. Flash (i.e. top 20%), middle 60%,
and leftover (i.e. bottom 20%) are defined based on
funding time ranking within each month. The basic
DID model is shown in specification (1).
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 +
(1)
𝛽𝛽2 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates the outcome variables including
funding time, number of investors, average funding
amount per investor and loan performance measures
such as CAGR, IRR, and default. Due to the skewed
distribution and the between-group variation of
funding time, number of investors, and average
funding amount per investor, we use the natural log of
each as the dependent variable. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 indicates
whether loan i belongs to the top 20% in terms of
funding time (“flash” loans), the middle 60%, or the
bottom 20% (“leftover” loans). When estimating the
model, we use the “leftover” loans as the baseline
group. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is defined as 1 if a loan was
listed after the treatment and 0 otherwise. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the
interaction of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 . 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
controls for other factors that might influence the
dependent variables (see Table2). Time fixed effects
are not included because they are collinear with
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 in the monthly analysis.
Specification (1) is designed to test hypotheses 1
to 3, which are about the direct impacts of algorithmic
trading on loan outcomes. We test hypothesis 4 via
conditional correlations rather than a DID model,
given that we lack a control group.
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 +
(2)
𝛾𝛾2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator of listing success, measured as
whether the listing passes the funding threshold
(passing funding threshold) and the actual funding
percentage (funding percentage). This model simply
tests whether listings are more likely to become loans
after the API upgrade. This allows us to test whether
the API upgrade increases the number of available
loans, thereby increasing the market size. We consider
alternative explanations for market growth (e.g.,
increased number of investors) via robustness checks.
We find that the API upgrade also changes the “taste”
of investors, which is not likely to be a consequence of
increased investor money (details not included due to
space limitations).
Although we don’t observe a direct transfer from
manual lending to algorithmic trading, the API

upgrade can fairly represent this situation because
before the API upgrade few investors were using the
API so the general environment was close enough to
manual lending.

4.3. Main results
The results of our tests of H1 to H3 are shown in
Tables 3 and 4. They are estimated based on
specification (1) and support H1. Column 1 of Table 3
show that after the API upgrade, “flash” loans get
funded much faster. The coefficient for the “flash”
loan group after the API treatment is -3.179 and
significant. This reduces the funding time of “flash”
loans by 95.8% ( e−3.179 -1); the corresponding
reduction for middle 60% loans is 62.7% (e−0.985 -1).
Considering the mean funding time for “flash” loans
is 4,032 seconds pre-treatment, the effect amounts to
eliminating 3,862 seconds.
Table 3. DID analysis on funding time and
investor concentration
Outcome
Variable
Post treatment

Log
(Funding
Time in
Seconds)
-0.303***
(0.037)
-5.016***
(0.110)
-1.557***
(0.056)

Log
(Number of
Investors)
0.012
(0.031)
-1.501***
(0.075)
-0.348***
(0.039)

Log
(Average
Funding
Amount)
0.000
(0.036)
1.399***
(0.077)
0.350***
(0.041)

Loan group: Flash
loans
Loan group:
Middle 60%
Loan group: Flash
-3.179***
-2.760***
2.835***
loans * post
(0.114)
(0.089)
(0.093)
treatment
Loan group:
-0.985***
-0.418***
0.394***
Middle 60% *
(0.077)
(0.045)
(0.047)
post treatment
Control variables
√
√
√
Loan term fixed
√
√
√
effects
Loan grade fixed
√
√
√
effects
# of observations
2,581
2,581
2,581
R2
0.8109
0.8049
0.8045
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.

H3 is also supported. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3
show that after the API upgrade, both “flash” loans and
middle 60% loans have fewer investors and a larger
average funding amount per investor. For “flash”
loans, the number of investors decreases by 93.7%
( e−2.760 -1) and the average funding amount per
investor increases by 1603% (e2.835 -1). Considering
the mean number of investors is 40 pre-treatment, the
decrease implies that approximately 37 investors are
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crowded out of “flash” loans after the API upgrade.
Middle 60% loans also experience a 34.2% decrease
in number of investors and a 48.3% increase in average
funding amount per investor.
Table 4 shows the results of our tests of H2.
Because algorithmic investors might have different
loan preferences than manual investors (e.g.
algorithmic investors might invest in only loans of
grade C, D, E, and HR while manual investors might
invest in only loans of grade AA, A, B, C, and D), we
test H2 by examining both absolute performance and
within loan grade performance (but we only show
results on absolute performance analysis due to space
limitation). We find weak to no evidence for H2. The
API upgrade doesn’t significantly affect the
performance difference between “flash” loans and
“leftover” loans. As shown below, this is likely
because “flash” loans have always outperformed
“leftover” loans: the API upgrade did not increase this
performance gap.
Table 4. DID analysis on lending performance

Outcome
Variable

Post treatment

CAGR

IRR

Default

-0.006
(0.010)
0.001
(0.012)
-0.000
(0.009)

-0.011
(0.013)
-0.001
(0.015)
0.000
(0.013)

0.022
(0.036)
-0.021
(0.038)
-0.028
(0.032)

Loan group:
Flash loans
Loan group:
Middle 60%
Loan group:
0.005
0.015
-0.065
Flash loans *
(0.015)
(0.020)
(0.049)
post treatment
Loan group:
0.018a
0.026*
-0.028
Middle 60% *
(0.012)
(0.016)
(0.041)
post treatment
Loan term
√
fixed effects
Loan grade
√
fixed effects
# of
2,626
2,626
2,626
observations
2
R
0.0029
0.0032
0.0504
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. a p value=0.119.

Table 5 shows the results of our tests of H4, which
were estimated from specification (2). This analysis is
based on the listing dataset rather than the loan dataset
used for testing H1 to H3. The coefficients for Post
treatment are always positive and significant,
indicating that after the API upgrade more loans are
funded. Considering the pre-treatment means of
funding percentage and passing funding threshold are
0.871 and 0.847, the 0.029 coefficient in column 1
represents a 3.3% increase in funding percentage
while the 0.034 coefficient in column 2 represents a

4.0% increase in funding likelihood. This suggests that
the API upgrade corresponds to an increase in market
size. It is possible that other events that occurred at a
similar time as the API upgrade might explain this
finding. However, the relatively narrow time window
that we use helps to make this less likely.
Table 5. Before/after treatment analysis on
funding percentage
Outcome Variable
Post treatment

Funding
Percentage
0.029***
(0.009)
√
√

Passing Funding
Threshold
0.034***
(0.011)
√
√

Control Variables
Loan Term Fixed
Effects
Loan Grade Fixed
√
√
Effects
# of observations
4,248
4,248
R2
0.0206
0.0311
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.

The main results can be explained by two
channels that are brought by API upgrade, which are
automated decision making and data-driven decision
making. Automated decision making is likely
contributing to reduced funding time while datadriven decision making is likely contributing to
increased lending performance. It is hard to say to
what extent each of them contributes to the results and
whether only a combination of them can lead to all the
observed results. This is an open question for future
research.

4.4. Robustness checks and additional analysis
The previous results suggest that algorithmic
trading reduces loan funding time, increases investor
concentration, and increases the market size. Although
the DID design can rule out the influence of trends that
affect all loan groups equally, it is still possible that
there are some confounding events that influence these
groups differently. One major concern is the inflow of
large amounts of investor money, which might yield
similar results as those that we find. To rule out this
alternative explanation, we analyzed one event in
which large amount of investor money became
available in the market. In May 2011, a large
institutional investor made a $150 million investment
commitment to Prosper. We viewed this events as a
treatment that affected the Prosper investment pool
and replicated our DID analysis using the months
around this treatment. The results in Table 6 indicate
that the treatment effects are similar to those that
reported in Table 3. However, the magnitude is far
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smaller: for “flash” loans, there is no significant
change in funding time, a 15.0% decrease in number
of investors, and a 17.6% increase in average funding
amount per investor. The corresponding magnitudes
from Table 3 are 95.8%, 93.7%, and 1603%.
Therefore, even if the API upgrade happened to
coincide with a huge inflow of investor money, our
effect is unlikely to be explained solely by the inflow
of investor money.
Table 6. Impacts of the inflow of large amounts of
investor money
Outcome
Variable
Post treatment

Log
(Funding
Time in
Seconds)
-0.012
(0.023)
-3.415***
(0.108)
-0.589***
(0.027)

Log
(Number of
Investors)
-0.127***
(0.028)
-1.008***
(0.056)
-0.358***
(0.025)

Log
(Average
Funding
Amount)
0.125***
(0.028)
0.884***
(0.056)
0.345***
(0.024)

Loan group: Flash
loans
Loan group:
Middle 60%
Loan group: Flash
0.021
-0.163**
0.162**
loans * post
(0.141)
(0.072)
(0.072)
treatment
Loan group:
-0.092***
-0.119***
0.099***
Middle 60% *
(0.035)
(0.035)
(0.035)
post treatment
Control variables
√
√
√
Loan term fixed
√
√
√
effects
Loan grade fixed
√
√
√
effects
# of observations
2,818
2,818
2,818
R2
0.7034
0.6546
0.3485
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. This analysis is
conducted at monthly level.

Regarding investment performance, we find no
support that algorithmic trading improves investment
performance. To explore this, we conducted an
additional analysis. It is possible that “flash” loans
have always outperformed “leftover” loans, and this
performance difference is not enlarged by the API
upgrade. In Table 7 we simply compare the
performance of “flash” loans, middle 60% loans, and
“leftover” loans in the year 2013. “Flash” loans (as
well as middle 60% loans) outperform “leftover”
loans: they have a 26.8% (0.009/0.038) advantage in
CAGR, a 23.1% (0.015/0.065) advantage in IRR, and
an 11.1% (0.028/0.252) advantage in default rate (i.e.
lower default rate). When funding time is used as the
key independent variable, the results are the same
(unreported but available upon request): slower
funding time predicts poorer performance. Given these
findings, we conclude that the API upgrade doesn’t

bring in an additional performance advantage for
“flash” loans compared to “leftover” loans (at least not
in the short term around the API upgrade).
Table 7. Funding time, algorithmic trading, and
lending performance
Outcome
Variable
Loan group:
Flash loans
Loan group:
Middle 60%
Constant

CAGR

IRR

Default

0.009**

0.015***

-0.028**
(0.010)
-0.019***
(0.005)
0.252***
(0.018)

(0.003)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.038***
(0.001)

(0.004)
0.015***
(0.001)
0.065***
(0.001)

Loan grade fixed
√
effects
Time fixed
√
√
√
effects
# of observations
20,183
20,183
20,183
R2
0.0034
0.0051
0.0355
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at month level. All models don’t
include credit information (to check absolute performance).

4.5. Implications for investor participation
Our results indicate that algorithmic trading
crowds out manual investors from “flash” loans and
middle 60% loans but also increases the market size.
Thus, it is not clear whether the absolute number of
loans available to manual investors increases or
decreases. Unfortunately, we cannot observe the total
investment amount from manual investors. Instead, we
create two proxy indicators for “crowd” loans, i.e.,
loans funded by manual investors. In the first
approach, we define a loan as a “crowd” loan when the
average funding amount per investor is less than $100.
We then count both the number of “crowd” loans and
the percentage of “crowd” loans per day before and
after the API upgrade. Panel A of Figure 3 shows the
result. The second approach (the results of which are
shown in Panel B of Figure 3) is similar, except that
we define a loan as a “crowd” loan if the number of
investors exceeds 100. With both measures, the
number of “crowd” loans increases after the API
upgrade, but the percentage of “crowd” loans
decreases. This suggests that even though manual
investors are being crowded out of some loans, market
growth allows them to continue to invest in the market.
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performance decline after the API upgrade, although
the decline is not always significant.
Table 8. Performance of “crowd” loans (number
of investor as key independent variable )
Outcome Variable

Post treatment
Number of investor
Number of investor
* post treatment
Constant
Panel A: “Crowd” loans under definition 1

CAGR
IRR
0.004***
-0.003**
(0.001)
(0.001)
-0.00002* -0.00008***
(0.00001) (0.00002)
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.038***
0.065***
(0.001)
(0.001)

Default
-0.041***
(0.005)
0.0002***
(0.0000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.252***
(0.018)

Loan grade fixed
√
effects
Time fixed effects
√
√
√
# of observations
29,657
29,657
29,657
R2
0.0035
0.0043
0.0540
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at month level. Credit controls are
excluded to check overall performance.

Table 9. Performance of “crowd” loans (“Crowd”
loan dummy as key independent variable)
Outcome Variable

Post treatment
Crowd loan
Crowd loan * post
treatment
Panel B: “Crowd” loans under definition 2

Figure 3. Total number and share of “crowd” loans
Although the quantity of loans available to manual
investors may not suffer from algorithmic trading, the
quality of loans might suffer. Because manual
investors are crowded out of “flash” loans and middle
60% loans, and because “flash” loans and middle 60%
loans always outperform “leftover” loans, it is
reasonable to expect that loans available to manual
investors are inferior. We test this directly in Table 8
and Table 9. In Table 8, the number of investors is the
key independent variable while in Table 9 the crowd
loan dummy variable (using definition 1 from above)
is the key independent variable. Under both
approaches the “crowd” loans available to manual
investors almost always perform worse than loans
funded by fewer investors. Based on the results in
column 2 in Table 8, compared with a loan funded by
1 investor, a loan funded by 101 investors has a lower
IRR with a 0.008 (0.00008*100) rate difference,
indicating a 14.5% (0.008/0.055) performance decline.
Column 2 in Table 9 shows a similar result, implying
a 19.2% (0.01/0.052) performance decline. In
addition, “crowd” loans experience an additional

Constant

CAGR
0.005***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.009**
(0.003)
0.020***
(0.001)

IRR
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.010***
(0.003)
-0.012**
(0.004)
0.052***
(0.001)

Default
-0.046***
(0.003)
0.022***
(0.007)
0.009
(0.008)
0.194***
(0.008)

Loan grade fixed
√
effects
Time fixed effects
√
√
√
# of observations
29,657
29,657
29,657
R2
0.0035
0.0040
0.0539
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at month level. Credit controls are
excluded to check overall performance.

To summarize the overall implications of
algorithmic lending on investor participation, we
compare four basic statistics of “flash” loans, middle
60% loans, and “leftover” loans before and after the
API upgrade. In Figure 4, the x-axis represents the
natural log of funding time in seconds and the y-axis
represents the number of investors. Circle size is
proportional to the number of funded loans and a
darker color indicates better loan performance. Arrows
show the changes triggered by algorithmic trading.
Loosely speaking, deep-pocket investors are more
likely to be algorithmic investors, so they can funds
loans in a faster and smarter way. As a result, they fund
the majority of “flash” loans and middle 60% loans,
which typically perform better than “leftover” loans.
Individual investors are more likely to be manual
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investors who are crowded out of “flash” and middle
60% loans by algorithmic investors. Although manual
investors may still be able to fully allocate their
money, they can only select from “leftover” loans,
which harms their investment performance. In a
nutshell, algorithmic trading creates a new lending
environment: algorithmic investors are likely to
achieve high returns at the expense of manual
investors, who are likely to receive lower (although
perhaps still acceptable) returns.

research areas, including online lending, algorithmic
trading, data-driven decision making, and more
broadly the economics of artificial intelligence. This
study also explores means to alleviate the “disparate
impact” of algorithmic trading on less sophisticated
investors.
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